INTRODUCTION
A standard principle of all insolvency regimes is that secured creditors take priority over other creditors and unsecured creditors are treated equally. In several jurisdictions, however, specific categories of unsecured claims, notably employees' claims for unpaid wages and contributions, are entitled to preferential treatment. Several comparative works have classified employee priorities around the world 1 and have addressed the complex issue of creditor statutory priorities 2 , but only few of them have assessed the institutional environment in which these priorities are embedded.
3 Employees, indeed, may also be protected through social security schemes established for compensating due wages and contributions that the insolvent employer has not paid. Thus, to understand how employees are protected against this risk, it is necessary analysing the interplay between employee priorities (if existing) and social security schemes across different jurisdictions, looking for common patterns or divergences. A common explanation for diverging combinations of institutional strategies across jurisdictions is the idea that such divergences are closely linked with specific national production regimes or with historical legal background. Within this conceptual framework, the theory of 'varieties of capitalisms' and the 'legal origins hypothesis' have gained a particular relevance: the former classifies all countries along the distinction between 'liberal' and 'coordinated market economies', while the latter argues that capital market developments depend on whether the legal origin of each jurisdiction is rooted in common law or civil law. 184 -195 . 3 See the studies of Johnson and Secunda, op. cit., n. 1. 4 See the seminal paper of R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer and R. W. Vishny, 'Legal determinants of external finance ' (1997) 52 The Journal of Finance 1131.
5 For simplicity, this study will refer to English law and to the English insolvency regime, codified by the Insolvency Act 1986, which applies in England, Wales and, with few exceptions, Scotland. In Northern Ireland, however, insolvencies are regulated by the The Insolvency (Northern Ireland) Order 1989, which entails rules that are in line with those of the Insolvency Act 1986. Therefore, all arguments discussed in this study are to be extended to all countries of the United Kingdom.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section describes the 'varieties of capitalism' theory and the legal origin hypothesis. The third section addresses the main goals of insolvency proceedings and illustrates the reasons why many insolvency regimes deviate from the principle of equal treatment of creditors. The fourth section compares French, German and English regimes; it will be shown that in the last 40 years England and Germany have developed in the same direction -namely reducing or repealing employee priorities -while the French regime of employment protection has remained unaltered. An historical analysis, therefore, reveals a complex scenario, that does not fully reflect the fracture between 'liberal' and 'coordinated' market economies, and between common law and civil law countries. The last section tries to make sense of this complex scenario; first of all, it will be shown that the tendency to replace employee priorities through social security schemes reveals a conceptual and cultural shift as to the position of labour in the business; finally, it will be argued that that employee priorities and social security mechanisms are not mere functional equivalents, with the consequence that their cumulative application is not always redundant.
SETTING THE SCENE: VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM, LEGAL ORIGINS AND CREDITOR PROTECTION
Two theories on the interplay of different institutional settings in different jurisdictions have gained prominence in the most recent scholarly researches on comparative company and insolvency law and have triggered a quite intense and still on-going debate: the 'varieties of capitalism' approach, and the 'legal origin' hypothesis.
The 'varieties of capitalism' approach, rather than a single theory, is a bundle of theories having some common elements. According to its first conceptualization, national political economies can be segmented into five institutional spheres: industrial relations, vocational training, corporate governance, inter-firm relations and worker-management relations.
7 National equilibriums among these spheres are clustered into two ideal-types of economies: 'liberal market economies' and 'coordinated market economies'. In the former, firms and other social actors coordinate their relations mostly by way of competitive market arrangements and market transactions. By contrast, in coordinated market economies, firms and other social actors also rely upon non-market relationships and top-down regulation.
The interplay and the combinations between different institutional settings are commonly characterised by reference to the concept of 'complementarity' between institutions. The starting point is that in each national economy, different institutional settings normally provide coherent incentives, reinforcing each other's efficiency and returns. 8 Institutions are considered complementary to each other when the presence of one institution reinforces the efficiency and the returns of other institutions ('complementarity as reinforcement').
9 In Germany, for example, companies rely on long-term investments and require employers to enter into firm-specific engagement, which corresponds to higher job stability and employment protection. 10 A consequence may be that different institutional settings, in order to work efficiently, should be coherent and should aim at attaining the same goals, while contradictory incentives and noncoherent institutions risk being inefficient.
11
This approach has triggered an intense debate. Indeed, within the same country, different institutional settings could be combined in several, sometimes apparently inconsistent, manners. Therefore, other scholars have argued that the concept of institutional complementarity should also explain institutional combinations and developments in the absence of a system designer that exclusively pursues abstract concepts of efficiency. 12 Institutions, in particular, could 'mutually compensate for each other's deficiencies', instead of pursuing identical goals. 13 This is the case when the tendency of an institution offsets the outcomes of other institutions or other social mechanisms ('complementarity as compensation').
The legal origin hypothesis, by contrast, is a coherent theory, according to which financial development and investor protection largely depend on whether a country's legal origin is common law or civil law.
14 The first papers that tested the legal origin hypothesis argued that common law countries (England and all derivative legal systems, including the U.S.) are better equipped for protecting creditors and outside investors, and that this origin explains their greater financial development in comparison to 'civil law' systems, in particular French-derived jurisdictions. 15 According to this view, the main reason of this difference is that common law' countries have a higher judicial flexibility and that they better protect property rights. In one of their latest contributions, La Porta et al. expanded the concept of legal origin, by adopting a broad conception of legal origin as a 'style of social control of economic life', according to which 'common law stands for the strategy of social control that seeks to support private markets outcomes, whereas civil law seeks to replace such outcomes with state-desired allocations'. 16 Interestingly, such expanded concept of legal origin perfectly fits into the distinction between liberal and coordinated market economies. Along this line of thought, it has been argued that a correlation exists between variety of capitalism and legal origin, since most liberal market economies have a common law origin, whereas most civil law jurisdictions are coordinated market economies.
17 The legal origins hypothesis was also applied to classify labour relations. Botero et al., in particular, selected three main areas of states' regulatory intervention (employment laws, collective relation rules and social security) and coded the rules included in these areas. The conclusion of this study was that common law countries protect employees less than civil law countries, and that a higher protection is associated with certain inefficiencies, such as higher unemployment and larger unofficial economy. 19 Their work, however, does not include employment protection through insolvency priorities.
Several scholars, however, have raised methodological objections to the legal origin hypothesis. One of the main criticisms is that in La Porta et al. study, variables representing laws and law systems are time-invariant and the analysis is simply cross-sectional. 20 Therefore, this approach does not take into account historical developments and cannot exclude reverse-causality. 21 Furthermore, in the legal origin model the legal dimension is an entirely exogenous phenomenon, while in reality the law is, at least in part, endogenous to economic development and political and social dynamics. 22 Some authors also maintain that the legal origin approach suffers from two other substantial flaws under a comparative viewpoint. First of all, legal families are depicted in an oversimplified fashion, which is biased in favour of common law countries. 23 Secondly, the descriptions of the institutional settings within each country, and within each legal family, do not take into account that in different countries functional substitutes could be in place aiming at attaining similar goals. 24 With the aim of addressing these problems, other scholars have recently constructed a new comparative scale considering a wider range of variables related to creditor protection mechanisms (hereinafter: the 'CBR Index'). 25 The CBR Index, differently from the comparative scale developed by La Porta et al., in order to capture a more realistic picture of creditor protection strategies also considers other variables, including mechanisms for protecting unsecured creditors.
26
Despite this significant difference, the index developed by La Porta et al. and the CBR Index share a similar approach regarding the variable measuring creditor protection, since a country receives a score of 1 when secured lenders are prioritised over any other creditors and when they can enforce their rights outside the procedure, whereas countries where statutory priorities are in place, or where a statutory stay applies to secured creditors, receive a lower score. 27 In other words, these specific variables only measure the priority system and the protection of secured creditors, not the protection of any kinds of creditors, and seem to move from the implicit assumption that secured creditors' absolute priority is per se a desirable policy goal. 28 In this regard, the most common argument supporting secured creditors' protection is that it avoids debtors' moral hazard, reduces the overall cost of credit and increases the willingness to lend.
29 It is worth stressing, however, that the rationale for secured creditors' absolute priority is debated and still puzzling. Several scholars, indeed, argue that secured credit absolute priority only redistributes value from non-sophisticated and involuntary creditors to sophisticated creditors 30 , and that efficiency gains are not, or not always, ascertainable.
31
It is now clear why, and to what extent, the 'varieties of capitalism' approach and the 'legal origin' hypothesis are significant for comparative legal researches and for understanding employee priorities. These theories, indeed, make possible a comparison of the interplay among complex and interdependent institutional settings pursuing similar goals. Regarding employee priorities, which alter ex post free-market bargains between a debtor and its creditors, both theories would predict that in 'liberal market economies' (and common law countries) no employee priorities should exist, and that 'coordinated market economies' (and civil law countries) should be more open to statutory priorities shaping the balance among stakeholders. 27 See: La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, op. cit., n. 15 p. 1135; Armour, Lele, Mollica and Siems, 'CBR Creditor Protection Index for the UK, the US, Germany, France, and India' (2006) Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge.
28 It is necessary remembering that a difference exists between the La Porta index and the CBR Index, as we have seen above: while the former is exclusively based upon this variable measuring secured creditor protection, the latter also measures, through other variables, the level of protection of unsecured creditors and is, consequently, more balanced and accurate. 
Creditors' equal treatment versus statutory priorities
One of the main goals of insolvency proceedings is addressing collective action problems faced by creditors when their debtors become insolvent. First of all, in order to prevent creditors from individually seizing their debtors' assets, a widespread strategy is providing a general stay of individual creditors' claims. Secondly, in order to avoid the risk that creditors reject a restructuring plans hoping to be paid in full if the plan succeeds (hold-out problem), rules on restructuring proceedings require that rescue plans are binding for all creditors when they are approved by a majority of creditors. According to a widespread view, insolvency rules should exclusively aim at facilitating the efficient liquidation of a debtor's assets or the most valueenhancing restructuring plan, to the advantage of all creditors, without altering pre-insolvency entitlements deriving from private bargains, such as pledges, mortgages and other guarantees. 32 It goes without saying that, in this conceptual framework, assets' distribution should follow the principle of par condicio creditorum, or pari passu, according to which secured creditors rank in priority to unsecured creditors and all unsecured creditors rank equally.
As a matter of facts, however, insolvency regimes are never neutral for the distribution of a debtor's estate to creditors and other stakeholders. Without a statutory stay of creditors' claims, for instance, creditors would seize the debtor's estate on a 'first come -first served basis', which would replicate a Hobbesian state of nature, where men are wolves for other men and the strongest prevails. 33 In the business world, the most sophisticated and best-informed creditors would prevail over the less sophisticated, and probably less affluent, creditors. A statutory stay, however, respects pre-insolvency creditors' entitlements, such as privately negotiated guarantees. By contrast, statutory priorities any other rules altering pre-insolvency entitlements have a more pronounced distributive impact. 34 In this regard, it is worth remembering that rules on creditors' ranking and priorities vary greatly from country to country, reflecting political options for the preferred equilibrium between classes of creditors 35 , as well as domestic legal concepts, so that any classification is likely to be incomplete. 36 Priorities, for instance, may be shaped in the form of privileges over proceedings deriving from the sale of specific debtor assets; such privileges could be characterised either as rights in rem, such as liens in common law jurisdictions, or as statutory alterations of creditors' ranking with regard to certain assets. 37 Regardless of specific national classifications and rules, what matters for the purposes of this study is classifying statutory priorities according to their impact on other creditors' claims; we should, therefore, distinguish between: (a) statutory priorities that treat certain unsecured creditors preferentially to other unsecured creditors, while secured creditors take a higher priority to all unsecured creditors (hereinafter: 'simple priorities'); (b) statutory priorities that treat certain unsecured creditors preferentially to all other creditors' claims, including secured claims (hereinafter: 'superpriorities').
Both simple priorities and super-priorities alter, albeit to different extents, the economic relations among creditors to the advantage of the preferred claims. Since an insolvent debtor's estate is likely to be not sufficient for satisfying all creditors' claims, statutory priorities, in practice, transfer value from other creditors to the prioritised class of creditors. While simple priorities just shift the economic burden of a debtor's insolvency from one class of unsecured creditors to another 38 , super-priorities also disregard privately negotiated guarantees to the advantage of certain categories of creditors. It is interesting to note that such rules produce redistributive effects among social actors by simply altering privately negotiated entitlements between a debtor and his or her stakeholders, instead of through tax-paid mechanisms. Needless to say that statutory priorities create tensions between prioritised and non-prioritised creditors. In this regard, we can borrow the words of the Cork Report, claiming that priorities should be 'justified by reference to principles of fairness and equity which would be likely to command general public acceptance.' 
Strategies for protecting employees
When a firm enters into insolvent liquidation, employees lose the financial resources aimed at supporting them and their families, unless social security mechanisms exist that sufficiently support their needs until they find another job. Employees are in a particularly vulnerable position since their investment is firm-specific and undiversified. 40 Employers, therefore, could exploit their position and behave opportunistically at workers' expense. Additionally, when the insolvent employer is a company, limited liability protects shareholders' private assets from creditors' claims, including employees' claims. Limited liability, therefore, exacerbates the risk of employers' opportunism 41 and, indeed, not paying due wages and contributions in the vicinity of insolvency should certainly be added to the list of such opportunistic behaviours. Bearing this in mind, it is clear that employee priorities related to due wages and contributions are strategies for addressing the risk that employers use their insolvency as a shield for avoiding labour obligations. 38 26 : 'with time it may become increasingly costly, both professionally and personally, [for a worker] to change employers', with the consequence that 'her present employer is in a position to act opportunistically toward her in setting wages or other terms of employment, compensating her only well enough to prevent her from leaving and thereby, in effect, appropriating the value of the job-specific investments, both professional and personal, that she has made'; Williamson, 'The theory of the firm as governance structure: from choice to contract' (2002) 16 Journal of Economic Perspectives, 171, at 185: 'workers who acquire firmspecific skills will lose value if prematurely terminated (and firms will incur added training costs if such employees quit)' and the risk of moral hazards on the employers' side 'will result in demands by workers for a hazard premium, and recurrent contractual impasses, by reason of conflict, will result in inefficiency'; Roy Goode, Principles of corporate insolvency law In continental Europe, employee priorities were probably firstly introduced by a reform of Tuscany insolvency law in 1713 42 , but the most famous version was in the French Civil Code of 1804, which codified previous French customary law that was aimed at protecting domestic workers. 43 In an era when a fully-fledged social security was not developed, employee priority was mainly justified as a form of workers' social protection. During the 20 th Century, the International Labour Organisation codified the necessity of having such priorities in place. In 1949 the ILO convention on protection of wages stated that 'in the event of the bankruptcy or judicial liquidation of an undertaking, the workers employed therein shall be treated as privileged creditors either as regards wages due to them for service rendered during such a period prior to the bankruptcy or judicial liquidation as may be prescribed by national laws or regulations, or as regards wages up to a prescribed amount as may be determined by national laws or regulations.' 44 Each state should establish the 'relative priority' of those claims in relation to other creditors, giving regard to specific domestic circumstances and, obviously, to domestic welfare state infrastructures. This convention was adopted in an era where progressive and 'Keynesian' ideas were functional to post-world war II reconstruction and were, therefore, shared values at international level.
In 1992, however, the same organisation approved a further convention on labour protection 45 , which watered down the original provisions. Indeed, according to the new convention, workers' claims should be paid before other unsecured creditors, while secured creditors are not mentioned 46 ; furthermore, employee priority could be reduced or abolished 'where workers' claims are protected by a guarantee institution'. 47 This innovation was the signal that the cultural and economic climate was changing -or had already changed -and that the interests of sophisticated secured lenders had gained relevance in the policy discourse. Indeed, a few years later, the Principles and Guidelines for Effective Insolvency and Creditor Rights System, issued in 2001 by the World Bank, gave more weight to the interests of business and bank and to the aim of protecting secured lenders. The Principles, in particular, stressed that '[a]ny priority placed ahead of the secured party represents a substantial cost, which is generally transferred back to borrowers in the form of higher interest rates and transaction costs. Often the public policy represented by the priority (say, benefiting workers) receives a minor and occasional benefit at a substantial cost to the entire commercial system. Such priorities should be eliminated, reduced, and, where public policy concerns are compelling, addressed by other legal reforms that do not compromise the system for secured lending'. 48 In other words, only if pressed by 'compelling political concerns' to protect workers, politicians should intervene preferably by not altering preexisting entitlements deriving from private bargains between a debtor and his or her creditors. There is an observable tendency to increase the categories of debts enjoying such priority, for example by giving this status to each new form of tax or duty or each additional employee entitlement. Indeed, in countries with a strong tradition of worker protection there is sometimes an acute tension between the provision of safeguards for employees against the consequences of their employers' insolvency and the need of the bankruptcy trustee to keep the business viable and, if possible, restore it to profitability, which may involve a sharp reduction in the workforce. ' This strategy clearly advantages sophisticated creditors, such as banks or large corporations, which have sufficient market power to require guarantees from their debtors. In a similar vein, the UNCITRAL legislative guide to cross border insolvencies, issued in 2004, emphasized that '[s]ome priorities are based on social concerns that may be addressed more readily by law other than the insolvency law, such as social welfare legislation, than by designing an insolvency law to achieve social objectives that are only indirectly related to questions of debt and insolvency. Providing a priority in the insolvency law may at best afford an incomplete and inadequate remedy for the social problem, while at the same time rendering insolvency proceedings less effective'. 49 The idea behind this suggestion is that employee priorities and social security schemes are like communicating vessels, so that if a social security scheme is sufficiently broad, employees can recover the full amount of due wages and contributions and priorities are not necessary or less important.
In the European Union, a preference for social security mechanisms can probably be read between the lines of the Directive on Employees' Protection 50 , according to which Member States should put in place mechanisms that guarantee the payment of employees' outstanding claims relating to their employment, by establishing a 'guarantee institution' for securing 'payment of employees' outstanding claims resulting from contracts of employment or employment relationships'. 51 Member States can exclude certain employees' claims from social guarantee's protection 'by virtue of the existence of other forms of guarantee if it established that these offer […] a degree of protection equivalent to that resulting from this directive'.
52 What is extremely interesting is that the Directive requires a factual and empirical comparison on whether a certain institutional setting is as effective as the mandatory 'guarantee institution'. The English regime is a telling example for alternative protections. The National Insurance Fund, protects employees' claims for due wages, with the exception of seamen's claims that are only covered by maritime lien. This is a guarantee created by operation of law over a ship and its cargo 53 , granting seamen a priority over other creditors. The question arises as to whether these two strategies (social security v. statutory priority) produce equivalent effects for employees. In this regard, the European Commission stressed that this lien 'may not always offer a degree of protection equivalent to that of the National Insurance Fund'. 54 Implicitly, the Commission argues that employee priorities are not as effective as social security schemes, and that Member States cannot replace the guarantee institution foreseen by the Directive on Employees' Protection through insolvency priorities. It is worth mentioning, however, that the Insolvency Regulation Recast of 2015 clearly stresses that different employee priorities across Member States are to be respected and that the next review of the regulation should identify further measures in order to 'improve preferential rights of employees at European level'. 
EMPLOYEE STATUTORY PRIORITIES IN FRANCE, GERMANY AND THE UNITED KINGDOM
In the next section, employee priorities and social security mechanisms in France, Germany and the United Kingdom will be compared and contrasted. These countries share a common element, namely the implementation of the Directive on Employees' Protection. Nevertheless, rules on employees' ranking and social security schemes are combined in different ways, according to own domestic political and economic agenda.
France
According to the French regime, when an employer enters into an insolvency proceeding, all claims deriving from labour contracts are protected by a super-priority that curbs secured creditors' claims. 56 Employees' super-priority has a broad scope, as it protects any employees' claims against their employers, including claims for paid leave. Such priority is capped at a monthly threshold of twice the amount used to calculate social and pension contributions, which can be increased and updated through a government regulation. 57 Since the monthly amount for calculating social pensions in 2015 was €3,170, 58 the statutory floor for employees' super-priority was €6,340. Employees' claims exceeding the monthly amount of the super-priority are entitled to a forth-rank privilèges généraux (a 'general privilege') on movable assets 59 and a second-rank general privilege on immovable assets 60 of their insolvent debtor. It is worth remembering that in France, like in other southern-European countries 61 , creditors' priorities have proliferated over recent decades and, in some cases, they have probably reached a saturation point beyond which preference creditors are scarcely protected or not protected at all. 62 By introducing a superpriority, therefore, the French legislator tried to effectively protect employees, since simple priorities are likely not to be effective.
Besides these priorities, employees are also protected through an insurance mechanism based upon employers' contributions. 63 In particular, all employers should insure the payment of all due salaries, including pension and insurance payments. This insurance mechanism is implemented through a special entity, created for that specific purpose by the national employer organisations, in agreement with the labour minister. 64 The insurance fund protects any contracts of employment, including part-time contracts, fixed-term and temporary contracts, and guarantees any due payment without time limitation, up to a maximum amount which is updated every year (in 2015 the amount was €76,080). When this insurance fund indemnifies employees, it is subrogated to employees' rights and is, therefore, entitled to super-priority vis-à-vis other creditors. The statutory priority, therefore, is a crucial element of this complex mechanism for protecting employees, for it allows the insurance fund (and indirectly its contributors: the employers as a class) to recover what it paid for protecting employees' claims. The ultimate burden of this mechanism is hence placed upon other unsecured creditors' shoulders.
Germany
Germany has a reputation for strong social security mechanisms and worker protections, and is considered a typical example of coordinated market economies. Bearing this in mind, we can predict that German employees should be entitled to both a statutory priority for claims related to due wages and a strong social security, similarly to France. Nevertheless, the German Insolvency Act 1994, which entered into force in 1999 65 , abolished all creditor priorities, including priorities protecting employee claims for due wages, with the sole exceptions of a limited list of statutory liens 66 and few other cases. 67 The lack of employee priority is compensated by a social fund collectively financed by German employers. 68 The policy goal of the German insolvency regime is to canalise employees' protections into just one strategy that socialises costs among the employers as a class. This social fund covers outstanding employees' claims related to a period of three months prior to the decision to open an insolvency proceeding, including wages, holiday pay, bonuses and pension contributions (Insolvenzgeld). This fund protects any employees with outstanding pay claims, including part-time employees, employees with fixed-term or temporary contracts, regardless of whether they are also protected by statutory unemployment schemes. In 2004, the maximum amount of Insolvenzgeld was capped at the level of the monthly unemployment scheme payment. 69 After a payment, the social fund is subrogated to employees' position vis-à-vis the employer. Therefore, the social fund does not enjoy any priorities and can only partially recover what it paid to employees.
A retrospective analysis, however, reveals that former insolvency rules of West Germany (Konkursordnung) 70 were amended in 1974 to introduce employee super-priority, similarly to the French regime. In particular, employees' claims for due wages over six months before their employers' insolvency ranked in priority to other creditors' claims, including secured creditors. 71 In the same year, the West German Parliament introduced the guarantee mechanism protecting employee's claims for due wages. 72 German employees' protection, therefore, followed the same path of France, just one year apart. In 1994, however, the Parliament of unified Germany, by reforming the insolvency law 73 , repealed all insolvency priorities, including employees' priority for due wages. This decision granted the pari passu principle to its full extent. 74 Another consequence is that the liquidator can avoid any payments made a short time before filing for insolvency, including employees' wages paid within three months prior to the opening of the insolvency proceeding are avoidable, if the employees were aware of the insolvency. 75 The official motivations for the Insolvency Act maintain that any creditor priorities are ultimately based upon arbitrary political decisions and, therefore, that these priorities are not logically justified. 76 The 1994 reform also increased the likelihood of rescue proceedings, while under previous Konkursordnung an insolvent debtor' liquidation was the most likely outcome of insolvency. 77 This issue was, however, intensively debated and the question arose as to whether this strategy would have harmed workers facing their employer's insolvency. In 1992, while debating the reform proposal, the main opposition party (SPD) agreed to repeal other creditor priorities, with the sole exception of employee priorities. 78 Two years later, however, the SPD accepted the idea of also repealing employee priorities, arguing that 'in practice, in at least ¾ of cases such priorities are only on paper and in the residual ¼ of cases these priorities are effective only in few cases', and that other social security strategies, such as the Insolvenzausfallgeld, 'and other rules' (perhaps referring to the whole social security mechanisms) provide better protection for employees. 79 Similarly, the official motivations for the Insolvency Act argued that the Insolvenzgeld was a sufficient protection for workers. The problem, however, was -and still is -that the Insolvenzgeld only covers the payment of the last three months of due wages, while the former super-priority protected due wages of the last six months before insolvency. Nevertheless, the official motivation for the Insolvency Act argued that this gap of three months was of scarce practical relevance, without further explaining why this was the case. 80 
United Kingdom
In the United Kingdom, creditor priorities are almost unknown, and insolvency rules respect pre-insolvency entitlements and private bargains between a debtor and its creditors. In this regard, it is worth remembering that in 2002 the Crown preference for unpaid taxes was also abolished. 81 The only exception is employees' preferential treatment regarding claims for due wages and contributions. Employees' claims, in particular, rank higher in priority than other unsecured creditors, while fixed secured creditors and insolvency practitioners' fees are prioritised over any other unsecured creditors, including employees. This protection covers any employees' due wages, including holiday remuneration and related rights 82 , for a period of four months prior to the starting day of the insolvency proceeding. 83 This priority, however, is capped Employees' Protection, offers a security scheme for protecting workers. 89 If an employer becomes insolvent, the National Insurance Fund, which is funded through contributions of both employee and employers, must pay debts owed to employees, including (if there was no unfair dismissal and the employer has given proper notice) arrears for a maximum of eight weeks at a rate of £464 a week, unused holiday pay, with a maximum of six weeks and up to a weekly limit of £464, and a statutory redundancy payment. The Insolvency Service protects any employment contracts, excluding merchant seamen (who, as we have seen above, are supposed to be sufficiently protected by maritime liens). 90 Furthermore, this protection does not cover masters or members of the crew of fishing vessels when their payment is a share of profits or gross earnings of the vessel. 91 The National Insurance Fund is subrogated to the rights of employees and is entitled to the same preferential status within the limit of £800 per employees. 92 Finally, in order to have a full picture of employees' protection mechanisms, it is necessary considering that the risk of being held liable for fraudulent trading or for wrongful trading, and the risk of disqualification, could deter directors from not paying due wages and contributions to employees. First of all, directors could be held liable towards the company when they intentionally defrauded creditors (fraudulent trading) 93 , for instance when they deliberately pay only some of their company's creditors, with the consequence that other creditors are not paid in full.
94 Furthermore, directors risk being liable to contribute to their company's assets, when they did not 'took every step with a view to minimising the potential loss to the company's creditors' in a moment when insolvency was unavoidable (wrongful trading).
95 In both cases, however, the liquidator should commence litigation and the insolvency assets support all costs, which makes such actions not frequent.
96 Directors' disqualifications, by contrast, is financed through public funding and prove much more effective.
97 Courts, in particular, can issue a disqualification order for 'unfitness' when they are satisfied that a director' conduct 'makes him unfit to be concerned in the management of a company'.
98 A typical case of 'unfitness' occurs when directors of a nearly insolvent company only pay certain classes of creditors, disregarding other creditors' claims.
99 Therefore, the risk of being disqualified might prevent directors from disregarding employee wages and contributions when insolvency approaches. 89 
Complementarity between employee statutory priority and insurance scheme
The comparative analysis undertaken so far reveals that France, Germany and the U.K. provide for social security schemes that protect employees' claims for due wages and contributions. Their strategies, by contrast, diverge significantly regarding the question whether employees also should be protected through insolvency priorities. France combines an employee 'super-priority' (within a high threshold) and a security scheme. This is, therefore, a case of 'complementarity as reinforcement', where two institutional settings (social security and statutory priority) aim at attaining the same goal and mutually reinforce each other. In Germany, employees do not enjoy any priorities and are only protected by a social security scheme based upon employers' contributions. Therefore, the interplay between insolvency rule and social security scheme is clearly a case of 'complementarity as compensation', where the social security scheme compensates the lack of employee priorities. 100 The English regime combines a priority and a social security scheme, but the employee priority is not as effective as their French counterparts: employees' claims are only prioritised over unsecured claims and floating charges, and their priority is capped at a low amount (£800). The picture is further complicated by the fact that directors face the risk of a disqualification order when they treat one class of creditors preferentially to the disadvantage of other creditors. The interplay between insolvency rules, social security schemes and disqualification rules is to be classified as 'complementarity as compensation', where certain institutional settings (the social security and the disqualification rules) compensate other institutions' weaknesses (employee priority).
The historical analysis conducted hitherto has revealed a much more complex scenario. In particular, France's policy has remained unaltered since its introduction in 1973. The most interesting developments, however, occurred in the U.K. and in Germany. In the former country, the nominal value of the priority has never been adjusted to inflation and currency devaluations, so that its real value in 1976 was roughly six times as big as it is today. Originally, therefore, the interplay between employee priorities and social securities was to be classified a weak version of 'complementarity as reinforcement'. In Germany, between 1974 and 1999 a super-priority was combined with a guarantee fund, and, therefore, its regime was identical to the French employees' protection regime.
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This longitudinal analysis leads to two interesting remarks. First, in the U.K. and Germany, albeit along different paths, the institutional complementarity between the ranking of employees' claims and social security schemes has changed. As we have seen, in both regimes these institutional settings were originally connected in the guise of a 'complementarity as reinforcement', while at the turn of the twenty-first Century the social security schemes compensated deficiencies as to labour priorities. Such evolution indicates that institution building (such as the decision of repealing employee priority or not adjusting the nominal value of its cap) 100 This comparative analysis is briefly summarised in the following 
